Ethical problems following the wake of gene technology
22.06.2006
By Jakob StaunThe World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) defines gene doping as ‘the non-therapeutic use of genes, genetic elements and/or cells that have the capacity to enhance athletic performance’. But what should the consequences be if genetic modification is used as a therapeutic help in repairing athletic injuries? Would that be considered genetic doping too?
When gene technology becomes established in medical treatment in the not too distant future, athletes suffering harmful injuries will also be offered this treatment. But if an athlete is therapeutically treated for an injury with the help of genetic technology, will he then be considered doped when he returns to the playing field, or is it possible to distinguish between therapeutic and non-therapeutic use?
Currently, the developments in genetic technology move faster than the ethical debate about its application to human life – and in this instance to high performance sport. But the dilemmas are real and challenge ethical preconceptions.
For instance: Seven-time winner of Tour de France, the American cyclist phenomenon Lance Armstrong was cured for testicular cancer in the early 1990s and returned as a healthy and altered cyclist. Should he have been banned from competition if his cancer treatment had involved genetic treatment?
Or what about the use of protein insulin-like growth factor-1 (IGF-1)? Research carried out to learn how to combat muscle-wasting diseases through genetic modification shows that a synthetic version IGF-1 could potentially help athletes boost muscle mass and speed up recovery from muscular injury.
Similar types of ethical questions arise when it comes to children of genetically modified athletes. Without their consent they have been genetically altered through their genetic inheritance.
What will the rationale be to ban such athletes from competition?
The World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) defines gene doping as ‘the non-therapeutic use of genes, genetic elements and/or cells that have the capacity to enhance athletic performance’. But what should the consequences be if genetic modification is used as a therapeutic help in repairing athletic injuries? Would that be considered genetic doping too?
When gene technology becomes established in medical treatment in the not too distant future, athletes suffering harmful injuries will also be offered this treatment. But if an athlete is therapeutically treated for an injury with the help of genetic technology, will he then be considered doped when he returns to the playing field, or is it possible to distinguish between therapeutic and non-therapeutic use?
Currently, the developments in genetic technology move faster than the ethical debate about its application to human life – and in this instance to high performance sport. But the dilemmas are real and challenge ethical preconceptions.
For instance: Seven-time winner of Tour de France, the American cyclist phenomenon Lance Armstrong was cured for testicular cancer in the early 1990s and returned as a healthy and altered cyclist. Should he have been banned from competition if his cancer treatment had involved genetic treatment?
Or what about the use of protein insulin-like growth factor-1 (IGF-1)? Research carried out to learn how to combat muscle-wasting diseases through genetic modification shows that a synthetic version IGF-1 could potentially help athletes boost muscle mass and speed up recovery from muscular injury.
Similar types of ethical questions arise when it comes to children of genetically modified athletes. Without their consent they have been genetically altered through their genetic inheritance.
What will the rationale be to ban such athletes from competition?