

Playing for power: João Havelange's path to FIFA 1958-1974

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Jean-Marie Faustin Goedefroid Havelange, or simply João Havelange, was elected to the presidency of the largest sports organization in Brazil, the Brazilian Confederation of Sports (CBD¹), in 1957. In 1958, in his first year as head of the CBD, João Havelange saw the Brazilian national football team win its first world championship in Sweden. Four years later, Brazil repeated the feat in Chile.

After the world Cups of 1958 and 1962, especially due to the existence of the star Pelé, the Brazilian national team was often requested to touring in several countries. Brazilian football became something like a "diplomatic tool" which both Havelange and the government took advantage of. Havelange, the CBD president, was the man who decided and organized the relevant commitments, setting, for example, the necessary agreements with Brazilian clubs with which the selected players had contracts.

Among the trips promoted by Havelange for "diplomatic"² purposes, may be mentioned: the Luso-Brazilian games, the result of a sporting exchange with Portugal³ in 1960; the tour with President João Goulart to Chile in 1963 to thank the Chilean government for the cordial reception in last year's World Cup⁴; the releasing of Pelé from Santos FC in 1965 to compete in a game in honor of Prince Phillip upon request of the Brazilian Foreign Ministry⁵ itself; the organization of the game in honor of Queen Elizabeth of England⁶, in 1968; the intermediation in 1969 for holding of a series of eight friendly matches in five different African countries: Congo, Nigeria, Mozambique, Ghana and Algeria.⁷

¹ Acronym form *Confederação Brasileira de Desportos*, its name in portuguese.

² This diplomatic tool did not operate solely for the Brazilian government's benefit, but for the benefit of Havelange himself as well.

³ Cf. *Folha de São Paulo*. Friday, 19/08/1960. Second Section, p. 9.

⁴ Cf. *Folha de São Paulo*. Friday, 26 de abril de 1963. First Section, p. 46.

⁵ Cf. *Folha de São Paulo*. Tuesday, 09 de novembro de 1965. Front page.

⁶ Cf. *A Gazeta Esportiva*, 03/08/1968. p. 7.

⁷ Cf. <http://acervosantosfc.blogspot.com.br/2011/09/o-dia-que-o-santos-parou-uma-guerra.html>

CBD had never been an entity with vast financial resources, and its new manager demonstrated the intention of changing this situation from the moment of his entry, when he said that the Brazilian government should allocate more resources to the sport.

The vital problem of CBD, and therefore of the Brazilian sport in general, is the lack of financial resources. I stated in Salvador and shall reaffirm here in São Paulo: for an activity that requires Cr\$ 15,000,000.00, the CBD has not received from the government, through the National Sports Council - Conselho Nacional de Desportos, CND - , more than Cr\$ 200,000.00. These data are enough to highlight the difficulties we face to give the patriot sports the administrative work that its indisputable greatness requires. If I get elected, my biggest concern will be to remove this obstacle that has stopped the CBD from indulging the fair claims of Brazilian athletes. [...] We are going to resort to trading houses, professional football [the bulwark of the CBD], the official funds, and fight for the creation of a sports lottery.⁸

The Brazilian manager had a great concern about the amount of money he would have in his hands to take forth both his professional and personal projects - not necessarily in that order. In 1958, he accomplished to get approval the 'Municipal Sports' Contest' for the city of Rio de Janeiro⁹, a lottery game of which the profits would go to the construction or renovation of stadiums and to the city's sport in general. However, this source of money did not last long, because already in 1961 President Jânio Quadros banned sports lotteries in the country¹⁰, due to the pressure from sectors who argued it was a chance-game¹¹.

From 1964 on, when the government was taken over by the military, the lobby for sports lottery resurfaced, but the project stayed for three years in the Chamber of Deputies until getting voted¹², and nevertheless nothing was done until December 1968. In early 1969, Havelange was asking a loan from the Federação Paulista de Futebol (the Football Federation from the State of São Paulo) for the activities of the CBD¹³.

⁸ Speech of Havelange reported by the newspaper *Folha da Manhã*. Saturday, 05/10/1957. General Topics Section. P. 9. Emphasis added.

⁹ The then Federal District of Brazil.

¹⁰ Cf. *A Gazeta Esportiva*, 09/03/1970. p. 17.

¹¹ *Folha da Manhã*. 13/01/1959. Front page.

¹² *Folha de São Paulo*, 13/09/1964, Esporte e Turfe, p. 03

¹³ Cf. *A Gazeta Esportiva*, 07/02/1969. p. 5.

After more than ten years in office, Havelange demonstrated to have full awareness of the social effects that could be engendered by sports - especially football. A clear demonstration of it was given in July 1968, when the manager brought the Brazilian national team to Mozambique in order to play the opening game of the Salazar stadium¹⁴.

The details of this game are very important to the argument of this article: this game happened during the period when the nationalist insurgency movement in Mozambique, Frelimo,¹⁵ was swelling its ranks to fight for the country's independence. That did not block the Portuguese rulers from inaugurating in Maputo a stadium baptized with the name of the Portuguese dictator, in a game whose civic symbols - national anthem, flags, etc. - were exclusively addressed to the colonial power, including the national team that represented them: the Portuguese¹⁶. This potentially hostile environment to the event did not prevent the new Mozambican stadium from getting crowded by more than 50,000 local fans.¹⁷

This chapter marked the career of Havelange as sports manager. The story of the opening game of the Salazar stadium was one of the largest demonstrations of political / social power harnessed by the sport.

The Brazilian political context in 1968

The military took over the government of Brazil on 1st April 1964 after giving a Coup d'État against president João Goulart. Their entry in power established a situation that constantly oscillated between legality claims and acts of exception¹⁸.

In July 1968, Brazil experienced its most turbulent political moment since the 'Revolution' of 1964. The student movement did marches under slogans like "*people in power*¹⁹", "*organized*

¹⁴ The stadium was first baptized with the portuguese's dictator name: Salazar. Currently it is called the Machava's Stadium.

¹⁵ Frente de Libertação de Moçambique. The popular front for fighting for independence.

¹⁶ At this time, Mozambique was officially a Portuguese cologne yet. Portugal played this game as the Home team.

¹⁷ Cf. *Folha de São Paulo*, 28/06/1968. Ilustrada, p. 8.

¹⁸ Cf. Chaim, op. cit., pp. 13-30.

¹⁹ "*Povo no poder*". *Folha de São Paulo*. 05/05/1968. p. 3.

*people overthrows the dictatorship*²⁰", "*against the wage squeeze*²¹", among others. The government responded to the successive manifestations of popular discontent with more repression and arrested most of the opposition movement's leaders.

The increasing repression by the military was followed by the intensification of the popular mobilization with strikes, marches, protests against the government and even acts of guerrilla warfare, as the kidnapping of the American Ambassador, Charles Elbrick, and of the German, Ehrenfried von Holleben.

On June 26, 1968, took place in Rio de Janeiro the apex of the opposition movement to the military rule: the "March of the One Hundred Thousand"²². Given this sequence of events, the military realized that their sequence in power was at risk. Part of the opposition had got armed and was doing bombings and bank robberies. The own coalition which used to support the President Costa e Silva appeared to be worn out.

A chance for Havelange

Four days after the "March of the One Hundred Thousand" in Rio de Janeiro, happened the inauguration game of the Salazar Stadium in Maputo, Mozambique. After returning to Brazil, Havelange declared:

It is only possible to gather an amount of 200,000 people in a protest rally or a stadium where it is played a football match. It is preferable to gather them in a stadium [for a football game]. This is why I think that the governments from all over the world should give greater support to football.²³

This statement was a rough public message to the president of the Republic: it is preferable to put a hundred thousand people (or 200,000, according to the statement of Havelange) in a football stadium than to have them all in a march in the streets protesting against the government.

²⁰ "*povo organizado derruba a ditadura*" Folha de SP, Idem.

²¹ "*abaixo o arrocho salarial*" Idem.

²² *Passeata dos Cem mil*, or *Marcha dos Cem Mil*.

²³ Speech of João Havelange, the then president of CBD, reported by *A Gazeta Esportiva*, 31/07/1968, p.8. Emphasis added.

Months later, on December 12th 1968, the Chamber of Deputies would vote to throw out a deputy, Márcio Moreira Alves, who had insulted the honor of the armed forces. If Alves was acquitted, it would represent a confrontation with the Brazilian Armed Forces, and would probably inflame the juvenile outbursts against the government.

Ten days before the parliamentary vote, President Costa e Silva called Havelange and Paulo Machado de Carvalho - president and vice-president of CBD – to talk. Before the conversation, the press had realized the political importance of football, of the national team and of the World Cup 1970, specifically:

The Brazilian Confederation of Sports [CBD] will make the request [for resources from the national government] assuming that the success of the national team in qualifying and especially in World Cup constitute factor of importance not only for sports, but also for politics, in view of the 1970's presidential elections.²⁴

Now the most powerful men of sports management as of the political management of the country would meet in the capital Brasília. On one side João Havelange, president of the CBD, Paulo Machado de Carvalho, Vice-President of the CBD, Brigadier Jerônimo Bastos, president of the National Council of Sports²⁵ (CND) and the Deputy Paulo Planet Buarque, an influential adviser of São Paulo FC. On the other side, the ministers Tarso Dutra²⁶ and Rondon Pacheco²⁷, Daniel Krieger, who was President of ARENA (the regime's political party) and leader of the government, and Costa e Silva, the president of the Nation, as well as advisors from various ministries²⁸.

When all were present, the president said:

²⁴ *Folha de São Paulo*, 03/12/1968. 1º Section, p. 18. Emphasis added.

²⁵ CND was a State entity created on the 1940's for managing sports.

²⁶ Tarso Dutra took over the Ministry of Education in 1967 during the government of Costa e Silva. He implemented Mobral (an adult literacy program) and signed the controversial agreement between MEC and US-AID. He joined the committee responsible for the final wording of the text of the Institutional Act #5. After the output of Costa e Silva from power, he was replaced by Jarbas Passarinho. Biographical data taken from <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/treinamento/hotsites/ai5/personas/tarsoDutra.html> on 14/05/2013.

²⁷ Rondon Pacheco, along with Tarso Dutra, was also responsible for writing the AI-5. He was considered moderate in the military, so he took away the toughest points of the first proposal of AI-5, such as the closing of Congress and the Supreme Court. Later, he was indicated by Médici himself for the presidency of the Arena (the military party). Informations taken from <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/treinamento/hotsites/ai5/personas/rondonPacheco.html>, on 14/05/2013.

²⁸ Cf. *A Gazeta Esportiva*, 05/12/1968, p. 8.

“I really think that Brazil cannot lose this championship [the 1970 World Cup]. We have to find a way, anyway.²⁹” [...] “In 1970 Brazil will be vying for the World Cup. As president, I would like that Brazilian people could, still in my mandate, celebrate this achievement.³⁰” [...] “We need to set everything very well, because after all in 1970 I’ll still be in the government, and I truly do not like the possibility of losing this championship.”³¹”.

Keeping in mind the economic hardship experienced during more than ten years ahead of CBD, Havelange said that Brazilian sport - read: the CBD - needed resources whose injection depended mainly of the country's president.

Readily Costa e Silva put himself at the disposal of Havelange for creating an effective funding source for " CBD. The first step would be to finally carry out the Sports Lottery project. Costa e Silva asked Havelange to provide an outline of the Sports Lottery and said:

I want things in the simplest way possible. After giving it a parliamentary wording, I will carry it forward to Chamber of Deputies³². [...] With the Sports Lottery you sirs are going to have so much money that is quite possible the federal government to ask you some loan.³³

A week after the conversation with these sports officials, the petition to process Moreira Alves - the deputy who had harmed the reputation of the armed forces - was denied by the Chamber of Deputies, and Costa e Silva decreed the Institutional Act #5 (from now on, AI-5, acronym for Ato Institucional nº 5), which established the state of exception indefinitely in the country.

CBD boosted with state money

Former Brazilian presidents Kubitschek³⁴ e Goulart³⁵ experienced World Cup victories during their administrations, and obviously did not stay indifferent to the national party caused by each

²⁹ *A Gazeta Esportiva*, 04/12/1968, p. 7. Speech of Costa e Silva published in the newspaper.

³⁰ *A Gazeta Esportiva*, 05/12/1968. p. 8. Another part of the Speech of Costa e Silva. Emphasis added.

³¹ *Folha de São Paulo*, 04/12/1968. 1º Section, p. 15. Speech of Costa e Silva a João Havelange and other representatives of Brazilian sport. Emphasis added.

³² *A Gazeta Esportiva*, 05/12/1968. p. 8. Outro trecho da Speech of Costa e Silva.

³³ *Folha de São Paulo*, 04/12/1968. 1º Section, p. 15. Emphasis added.

³⁴ President between 1956-1961.

³⁵ President between 1961-1964

of these championships. However, neither they nor their successors Jânio Quadros³⁶ and Castello Branco³⁷, the first military president, came close to encouraging the development of a nationwide sports project.

Nothing suggested that Costa e Silva's rule would be different on the sports' issue, until the moment he decided to declare state of exception. In doing so, alternative bases of political support became necessary, and football was one of them. In the alliance between Costa e Silva and João Havelange, each of them had the object of greatest desire for the other: 'Costa' had the political power to finance and support the sports projects and the personal and political pretensions of Havelange; Havelange was the only leader with power and capacity enough for managing sport in the most convenient way in order to generate political stability and support for Costa e Silva.

However, 'Costa' had to leave³⁸ - due to illness - the post of president on 30 September 1969. His successor, Emilio Garrastazu Médici, joined the Presidency of Brazil on 30 October 1969.

The entry of Médici in the presidency was the culmination of a political era whose main feature was the priority of government's projects over any individual rights, which thereafter could not find any warranties in the Constitution.

The focus shifted to the pursuit of development and economic progress, no matter the cost. Médici's purpose was to claim political legitimacy by accomplishing his end goals rather than by the methods used to get to them. The bet of the Médici and his supporters was that the country would improve so much under his rule, that improvements conquered would somehow overshadow the repressive methods used to get them. To underline his need for success, there has never been another Brazilian president who allocated so much money to sport as he did.

Most of the money which came into CBD during the first half of 1970 was invested on physical and technical preparation for the players who would play the World Cup in Mexico in June that year. When winning the third championship – which is, until today, the most remembered out of

³⁸ Cf. *A Gazeta Esportiva* 01/09/1969. Front page.

all five which were won by Brazil –, Brazilian people went into a state of ecstasy, and the military allocated since then even more money to sport: they invested massively in building stadiums, they agreed with Havelange to create a national football league – which still exists – and exploited the prestige of the national team and its biggest star, Pelé, to exhaustion.

Having a "carte blanche" of Medici to lead Brazilian football from 1970 onwards, Havelange began to get personal benefit from the existing symbolic capital around the national team. Havelange's eyes were set on FIFA.

FIFA before Havelange

FIFA - Fédération Internationale de Football Association, in French - was founded on 21 May 1904 in Paris. Its founding members were the national associations of Belgium, Denmark, France, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland³⁹. During the two world wars of the twentieth century, this body experienced a few moments of instability. When these conflicts went over, it could be gradually restored, and in 1954 it had already grown to 84 members⁴⁰.

Gradually, this entity was changing its profile from Eurocentric one to more cosmopolitan. The following table lists its presidents and Secretaries-General since its founding until 1970:

TABELA 1: PRESIDENTES E SECRETÁRIOS GERAIS DA FIFA

Tenure	President	Country of origin	Secretary General	Country of origin
1904-06	Robert Guérin	France	Louis Muhlinghaus	Belgium
1906-18	Daniel Burley Woolfall	England	Cornelis August Wilhelm Hirschman	Netherlands
1921-54	Jules Rimet	France	Cornelis Hirschman /	Netherlands/

³⁹ Cf. <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FIFA>, consulted on 30/10/2013.

⁴⁰ Cf. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_FIFA, consulted on 30/10/2013.

			Ivo Schicker	Germany
1954-55	Rodolphe Seeldrayers	Belgium	Kurt Gassmann	Switzerland
1961-74	Stanley Rous	England	Kurt Gassmann / Helmut Käser	Switzerland/ Switzerland

Table drawn up in consultation made on 10/30/2013 with data from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_FIFA, which confer to the published by A Gazeta Esportiva in 09/06/1974, page 13.

The table shows that before 1974 there was no President or Secretary General of FIFA who were not Europeans. European hegemony was certainly not a problem in the 1930s, when FIFA had only forty members, most of them European. Four decades later, however, there were 141 member countries in the organization. In this sense, the 1960s were a 'turning point' for the "continental" composition of the entity⁴¹. Among the countries whose national associations joined FIFA in that decade may be mentioned, among others: Burkina Faso (1960), Puerto Rico (1960), Somalia (1960), Cote d'Ivoire (1961), Togo (1962), Jamaica (1962), Benin (1962), Cameroon (1962), Algeria (1963), Trinidad and Tobago (1963), Libya (1963), Papua New Guinea (1963), Tanzania (1964), Gambia (1966), Bahamas (1968).⁴²

As the scenario of under-representation of the third world was becoming evident, the English president Stanley Rous, in office since 1961, started expressing concerns about the possible end of European dominance. Not only him, but most of the representatives of European associations as well.

The growing power of African-asian nations in this international sport [football] is creating concerns to the Europeans and threatening to destroy the powerful structure of the organization. That is the surprising opinion of senior English football leaders who viewed this organism to grow. [...] According to informants in London, European associations and the South American federations opined that their traditional leadership position in FIFA is threatened by 'a democracy that mads'. With the admission of Nepal and Qatar, last year, 60 percent of the members of FIFA are African-asian countries that want to have a greater voice in the committees and in the executive branch, which is

⁴¹ Cf. These data were verbally issued by Havelange, and were reported by *A Gazeta Esportiva* on 08/06/1974.

⁴² According to research made in <http://en.wikipedia.org/> on 30/10/2013.

dominated by South American and European representatives. The democratic principle of one country, one vote, which is the basis of the organization, is also an issue that could cause the sinking of FIFA. [...] The Englishmen fear the possibility of being defeated in a vote by the smaller members, what could put the world football in inexperienced hands. When delegates get gathered in Paris [in August 1972], the African-Asian bloc is going to be able to provoke a confrontation that Europeans and South Americans could judge unsustainable.⁴³

With 60% of the members from either African or Asian countries, the Europeans found themselves in a situation that any alliance among those two continents could bring down their hegemony. The third world vacuum had already been perceived by the Brazilian manager, who still in 1969 expressed himself about the need for change on the political direction of the organization⁴⁴.

The Independence Cup

Havelange scheduled for 1972 an event to commemorate the 150th anniversary of Independence of Brazil. The championship would take advantage of the World Cup won by Brazil two years before, and would bring the national team to play at home against the strongest national teams of the world. The plan was to hold an event similar to the World Cup, within a total of twelve stadiums with large public capacity in different cities and regions of the country – which were, by the way, properly inspected and approved by FIFA and its president Stanley Rous⁴⁵.

By the end of 1971 the presence of Germany, France, Spain, Italy, Russia and Portugal⁴⁶ was taken for granted.

Boycott?

In early 1972, everything changed. To the surprise of Havelange, other CBD directors and even part of the Brazilian press, some the national federations began successively to cancel their

⁴³ *Folha de São Paulo*, 25/12/1971. First Section, p. 16. Emphasis added.

⁴⁴ Cf. Declaração de Havelange a *A Gazeta Esportiva*, 29/06/1969, p. 4.

⁴⁵ Cf. *A Gazeta Esportiva*, 07/08/1971, p. 5.

⁴⁶ Cf. *Folha de São Paulo*, 21/12/1971. First Section, p. 34.

participation in the Independence Cup: firstly England⁴⁷. After them Germany, Italy, Spain and even Mexico⁴⁸ with whose federation Havelange had prestige.

Faced with the refusal of those teams, Havelange also invited the Netherlands⁴⁹, Austria and Belgium⁵⁰, which also refused.

After many refusals, the European teams who actually came to the Independence Cup were France, Portugal, Ireland, Yugoslavia, Scotland, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. That made it a tournament of minor importance.

The Brazilian sports managers did not express themselves publicly, but the national sports press was aware that the resignation of Western European countries was not only due to technical issues:

The hidden reasons for such refusals could be two, one of them strictly the application of João Havelange for presidency of FIFA. No South American man has ever managed the world football body. A successful Independence Cup could pave the way for Havelange's career. By the way, on one occasion, the president of the CBD even admitted this hypothesis by stating, in Rio 'My candidacy is bothering a lot of people'.⁵¹

Havelange heads the third-world alliance

The Independence Cup and the Havelange's campaign were happening in a context where part of the Third World countries began to make their displeasure with FIFA public. In early 1972 there were rumors⁵² that the European commanders of FIFA would not allow African countries to have a qualitative vote (vote of equal value) in the entity's deliberations, which would run against the principle of 'one country, one vote'. As a last resort to ensure the maintenance of its hegemony at the head of world football, the [European] leaders even considered the creation of a new

⁴⁷ Cf. *Folha de São Paulo*, 03/02/1972. First Section, p. 31.

⁴⁸ Cf. *Folha de São Paulo*, 05/02/1972. First Section, p. 28.

⁴⁹ Cf. *Folha de São Paulo*, 26/02/1972. Esporte, p. 02.

⁵⁰ Cf. *Folha de São Paulo*, 02/03/1972. First Section, p. 34.

⁵¹ *Folha de São Paulo*, 23/05/1972. First Section, p. 28. Emphasis added.

⁵² Cf. *A Gazeta Esportiva*, 12/02/1974, p. 6.

association for international football⁵³. However, they would need the support of the South Americans, who did not endorse the idea.

In 1972, for example, the president of the African Football Confederation (CAF), Yidnekachew Tessema had a fierce public discussion with Stanley Rous, who said that CAF had serious problems:

[CAF]... does not have serious problems. Its competitions are organized regularly and 90% of its associations take part in the games. It is not up to the FIFA President to make suggestions that weaken the structure of a Continental Confederation, which, on the contrary, deserves praise from FIFA for what it has done with the few means at its disposal. Our only serious problem is financial, and any intervention of the president of FIFA in resolving it will be welcomed.⁵⁴

The Independence Cup was designed to be the starting point for intensifying Havelange's presidential campaign, and turned out to be the meeting of federations who were previously willing to support his candidacy. This was not something premeditated by the organizers, but was a result of the boycott by his opponents. Among the associations that came to the Cup, some ended by declaring, even in Brazil, their vote in Havelange for the presidential election of FIFA: João Sadoul, president of the French Football Federation declared that *"the vote of France is to João Havelange, who will surely be the next president of FIFA"*⁵⁵. Lika Bajevic, president of the Yugoslav Football Association, said that *"if João Havelange actually apply for the presidency of FIFA, Yugoslavia will give him, seamlessly, its vote"*.⁵⁶

Besides these two European leaders, Jean-Claude Ganga, secretary general of the African sports, said that Africans were not satisfied with the current situation and signaled they would be willing to support Havelange, depending on the program the Brazilian would present ⁵⁷; he also

⁵³ Cf. *A Gazeta Esportiva*, 12/02/1974, p. 6.

⁵⁴ Excerpt of the speech of Tessema, president of the African Confederation of Football, responding to a comment done by Stanley Rous on FIFA's own newsletter. Emphasis added. Reported by *A Gazeta Esportiva* on 14/06/1972.

⁵⁵ Speech of João Sadoul, presidente da Federação Francesa de Futebol, reported by *A Gazeta Esportiva* em 14/06/1972. P. 20.

⁵⁶ Speech of Lika Bajavic, president of the Yugoslav Football Association, reported by *A Gazeta Esportiva* em 30/06/1972, p. 3.

⁵⁷ Cf. *Folha de São Paulo*, 18/06/1972. Esporte, p. 16.

wondered, however, to which extent the African countries would benefit in future sports competitions.⁵⁸

This tournament had so much political importance at the sport level, that the CBD payed out with its own money a series of "gifts", such as flight tickets and stays of all delegations, the distribution of over 25,000 posters around the world, keychains and commemorative lapel pins⁵⁹. In addition, 1,000 commemorative certificates were produced for the players and members of the technical committees of all delegations. More than 100 luxury diplomas were prepared to be delivered to the leaders and special guests from each delegation⁶⁰. As if it was not enough, Havelange himself paid for a disc with the "Independence Cup anthem" and financed its distribution⁶¹.

Brazilian politicians were aware of how unprofitable the 1972 tournament was:

Besides undermining the financial system of the federations, the Independence Cup will still needlessly wear the prestige of our three-time champion team in the world and deflate our dollar reserves, everything to satisfy the vanity of João Havelange, who at all costs wants to get to the presidency FIFA.⁶²

There were fears that the bulky spending on promotion and advertising of the tournament, combined with the absence of major European teams, would generate a shattering debt to CBD.

The absence of teams like England, Germany and Italy will deviate the public from stadiums, what besides making the Independence Cup deficient, will cause fatal damage to the CBD and the country. It should be noted that all expenses of invited national teams will be paid for in dollars, including the costs of their coming and return, hosting and successive travels in Brazil, since the tournament will be played in various cities.⁶³

⁵⁸ Cf. *A Gazeta Esportiva*, 17/06/1972, p. 13.

⁵⁹ Cf. *A Gazeta Esportiva*, 26/05/1972. P. 7.

⁶⁰ Cf. *A Gazeta Esportiva*, 26/05/1972. P. 7.

⁶¹ Cf. *A Gazeta Esportiva*, 30/05/1972. P. 18.

⁶² Speech of the deputy Mauricio Toledo, from the party ARENA-SP, reported by *Folha de São Paulo*, 10/05/1972. Sports Section, p. 7.

⁶³ Speech of the deputy Mauricio Toledo, from the party ARENA-SP, reported by *Folha de São Paulo*, 10/05/1972. Sports Section, p. 7.

No one knows for sure how much of the CBD deficit that was generated specifically by the Independence Cup⁶⁴, but it is known that in January 1975 – when Havelange stepped down as chair of the organization – the Confederation had a US\$ 1.75 million deficit (on that time's currency), mostly related to the Independence Cup and the interests that arose from the entity's inability to pay the loans taken to fund it.⁶⁵

Pelé enters the pitch

Also Pelé was absent. Having already left⁶⁶ the Brazilian team in 1971, the *King of Football* refused to play the Independence Cup in Brazil, although he has been repeatedly invited – and even pressured⁶⁷ – by Havelange. Despite this, Pelé became fundamental for the electoral campaign of João Havelange for President of FIFA in 1974.

A genius within the field, the *King of Football* did not perform as well on the outside. It is said⁶⁸ that in 1969, after a series of failed investments, Pelé had reached a deficit of approximately US\$ 240,000 (calculation for the year of publication of the material, 1999). Havelange took advantage and approached Pelé with the intention of using him as a canvasser to reach the presidency of FIFA. In return, he put himself at the disposal of the 'King of Football' to seek commercial partners that could contribute to his financial recovery. The agreement was made, and Pelé supported the candidacy of Havelange⁶⁹; three years later the player would end up being fined by the Brazilian government for tax evasion, and Havelange would donate him even more money from the CBD.

The official estimation⁷⁰ is that Havelange's donations from CBD to Pelé were, altogether, US\$ 320,000 between the years 1966 and 1973. Havelange's efforts with money that was not his own

⁶⁴ In the 24th September 1979, Sports' Section, p.4, *Folha de São Paulo* asserts the whole Cr\$13 million [=US\$ 1,75 million] debt was generated by the Independence Cup.

⁶⁵ Cf. *Folha de São Paulo*, 08/01/1979. Esporte, p. 4.

⁶⁶ O Jogo de despedida de Pelé foi entre Brasil e Iugoslávia em 18/07/1971, no Maracanã.

⁶⁷ Cf. *A Gazeta Esportiva*, 09/07/1971. P. 14.

⁶⁸ The newspaper *Folha de São Paulo* published on 07/11/1999 a Special Section on the life of Pele. The newspaper says it had, for making this Section, access to unpublished documents of the military dictatorship. The sequence in this article is based on information collected from this source.

⁶⁹ Cf. *Folha de São Paulo*, 07/11/1999. Special Section, p. 3.

⁷⁰ *Folha de São Paulo*, 07/11/1999. Special Section "A Criação de Pelé – as jogadas extracampo do atleta do século", p. 2.

to keep the figure of Pelé close to him was not in vain: Out of all the FIFA delegates with voting rights in Frankfurt in 1974, at least 42 asked the Brazilian official for contact with the player. After the agreement between the president of CBD and Pelé has been concluded, all requests were satisfied⁷¹. Some delegates accomplished to get either the Brazilian national team, thanks to Havelange, or Santos FC, with the interference of Pelé, to their home country. Day by day, football games were being converted into voting promises to the then president of the CBD.

Between 1971 and 1972, the Brazilian military increased its investigations into Havelange's affairs. This investigation showed later that the money from the CBD funded tours of Santos FC and the national team for a lower pay than usual⁷²: Normally, Brazilian national team requested US\$ 50,000 per match played abroad; thanks to Havelange, the value dropped⁷³ to US\$ 30,000.

A similar process occurred with Santos FC; instead of earning US\$ 8,000 for a friendly match played outside Brazil, it was paid only US\$ 4,000 in games that were of interest to Havelange.⁷⁴

The presence of Pelé in the campaign of the CBD's President continued until the actual day of the FIFA elections in 1974, when the player was present and took part in the final contact with voters.⁷⁵

In return, Havelange spoke to large multinational companies who might be interested in partnering with the *King of Football* and contributing to his financial recovery: he sent letters to directors of companies like Coca-Cola and Pepsi, suggesting that they could use the public appeal of the image of Pelé to sell their products, in a way similar to the one he himself had used in his campaign for FIFA:

In the Santos FC's tours abroad, he [Pelé] has time available to teach children to play football. It would be an important initiative for Pepsi, for the sport, and I'm sure to Pelé himself as well..⁷⁶

⁷¹ Cf. *Folha de São Paulo*, 07/11/1999. Special Section, p. 3.

⁷² Cf. *Folha de São Paulo*, 07/11/1999. Special Section, p. 3.

⁷³ Cf. *Folha de São Paulo*, 07/11/1999. Special Section, p. 3. There is a specific game in which this practice was publicly reported: Tunisia 1x4 Brazil, on 6th June 1973. Apud *Folha de SP*, on 8th June 1998. Special section: "Era Havelange". P. 7.

⁷⁴ Cf. *Folha de São Paulo*, 07/11/1999. Special Section, p. 3.

⁷⁵ Cf. *Folha de São Paulo*, 07/11/1999. Special Section, p. 3.

The suggestion was accepted by Pepsi, which hired the athlete to promote its brand by giving football clinics abroad when Santos FC toured outside Brazil⁷⁷. This agreement would last, with the interference of Havelange and Henry Kissinger, the US Secretary of State 1969-77 –, until the World Cup in Germany 1974, when Pelé served as canvasser of Havelange and the Public Relations of Pepsi, while also being a commentator for the important broadcaster TV Bandeirantes.⁷⁸

It is important to stress that CBD had, since 1970, the money from the Sports Lottery as its main source of funding. It was with this lottery's money that CBD promoted most of its activities. Because the Sports Lottery was a federal program to support the sport in Brazil, the misuse of its funds could create serious troubles for Havelange with the government.

Aside the scandalous expenditure on the Independence Cup, CBD abstained from receiving many thousands of dollars on friendly games that the Brazilian national team held abroad by lower quotas than usual. This was even denounced by a deputy – Mauricio Toledo – of ARENA (the party of the military) in September 1973:

Mr. João Havelange, president of the CBD, and his minions seized the entity and are treating it as a private property, from which they refuse to leave and use uniquely to their own interest [...].⁷⁹

The military government had full knowledge of the private use of public money by the nation's top sports official, but even so did not rebuke him. When asked by the press, the minister Jarbas Passarinho – the military man whom Havelange was supposed to respond to – replied:

If Havelange intended to add political value up for himself with the last tour of the national team in order to run for the presidency of FIFA, this is a forgivable sin.⁸⁰

⁷⁶ Excerpt from a letter written by Havelange to the directors of Pepsi, reported by *Folha de São Paulo* em 07/11/1999. Special Section, p. 3.

⁷⁷ Cf. *Folha de São Paulo*, 07/11/1999. Special Section, p. 3.

⁷⁸ Cf. *Folha de São Paulo*, 07/11/1999. Special Section, p. 3.

⁷⁹ Speech of the Deputy Mauricio Toledo himself, when asking for government investigation over Havelange and CBD. Reported by *Folha de São Paulo*, 20th September 1973. Third Section, p. 13.

⁸⁰ Speech of the Minister of Education and Culture, Jarbas Passarinho, published by *A Gazeta Esportiva*, 25/10/1973, p. 2. Emphasis added.

The Brazilian government did not interpose, therefore, in the Havelange's campaign for FIFA, even though it had arguments and facts that would authorize it to do so.

The election

In his campaign, Havelange named himself the '*candidate of world football*⁸¹' as opposed to Rous, who had no qualms about putting himself as a defender of the sequence of European hegemony at the helmet of the world body.

No wonder that the main focus of Havelange's campaign were the African countries, which for many years had been demonstrating their dissatisfaction with President Rous and held a substantial amount of votes for the election.

The Brazilian national team and the Santos FC of Pelé were taken to several games at that continent at the end of the 1960ies. After that, Havelange made the invitation for Africans to send one common team to Brazil to play in the Independence Cup.

In the African team that eventually arrived, there were players from the following countries: Tunisia, Togo, Egypt, Morocco, Algeria, Ghana, Congo, Zaire, Ivory Coast, Cameroon and Mali. In all, eleven African countries were represented at the Independence Cup, and for some of them it was the first time they got represented in an international football tournament outside their own continent.⁸²

Havelange's electoral platform to FIFA was composed by eight bullet points, whose most significant proposals for change were

1. Change from 16 to 20 in 1978 and 24 in 1982, the number of finalists to the next World Cup without, however, changing the duration of the competition, as currently established.
[...]
4. Assist least developed and developing countries' national federations with sporting equipments.
5. Assist least developed and developing countries' national federations with regard to the construction of new *stadia* and the improvement of existing ones.
[...]

⁸¹ Cf. *A Gazeta Esportiva*, 01/06/1974, p. 06.

⁸² Cf. *A Gazeta Esportiva*, 06/05/1972, p. 06.

6. Hiring doctors, coaches, physical trainers and organization experts to minister teachings in the least developed countries for the better and faster improvement of their knowledge of football, in English, French, German, Russian and Spanish.
8. Transform the current continental contest between the winners of Europe (UEFA) and South America (ASAF), into a Intercontinental Cup of Clubs, among the winners from Europe, America, Africa and Asia, under the direction of FIFA, with special regulations for a competition of this nature.⁸³

With this democratizing platform, Havelange knew, even before the elections, he would have the support of twelve Arab countries, ten countries of Central America, twelve African French-speaking countries, plus the Europeans France, South Ireland, Greece, Cyprus, Turkey and Luxembourg⁸⁴, without taking into account the ten South American countries that performed his base since the campaign's beginning. As it turns out, his constituents were, with rare exceptions, representatives of Third World countries.

The points on this platform were reiterated in a South American Confederation Congress held in Rio de Janeiro in December 1973. During the holding of this Congress, CAF President Yidnekatchew Tessemaa assured the full support of his confederation to the candidacy of Havelange.⁸⁵

Seeing his opponent would get much of the Third World votes, the final attitude of Stanley Rous was to secure the 1978 World Cup to the Argentines⁸⁶ and the 1986 World Cup to the Colombians⁸⁷ as an attempt to captivate these South American countries.

As the date of the election was approaching, European leaders started emphasizing that the dispute between Rous and Havelange was a metonym for a battle of Europe against the rest of the world for the control of world football. Rous said

I call you to vote for me because this is Europe against South America [...]

As Rous, Artemio Franchi, President of the European Union of Football Association (UEFA), also appeared tormented:

⁸³ João Havelange's management platform, according to report of *A Gazeta Esportiva*, 25/10/1973. P. 4.

⁸⁴ Cf. *A Gazeta Esportiva*, 25/10/1973. P. 2.

⁸⁵ Cf. *A Gazeta Esportiva*, 05/12/1973. P. 2.

⁸⁶ Cf. *A Gazeta Esportiva*, 23/05/1974. P. 3.

⁸⁷ Cf. *A Gazeta Esportiva*, 10/06/1974. P. 3.

We will not be ruled by anyone who is not from here [Europe] and that is not according to our points of view. [...] UEFA has no intention of being submitted to the control of FIFA. We are determined to maintain our independence and not giving in to the will of others⁸⁸. [...] UEFA possesses eighty percent of world football movement and ninety percent of this same movement from the economic point of view. This is worth a lot, and we will know how to charge it.⁸⁹

In the elections of 11th June 1974, Havelange was elected president of FIFA in the second round of votes, with a score of 68 against 52 votes for Rous. It is estimated that the Brazilian received about 30 votes only from African countries.⁹⁰

The African continent was recognized both by the winners and losers as the 'key factor' of the elections. Upon completion of the election, Tessema said: "*We, from Africa, we have as many rights as anyone else in the world, and Mr. Havelange was the first to extend the hand to us. Such a man deserves respect and prominence*"⁹¹.

⁸⁸ Speech of Artemio Franchi, president of UEFA in the same Congress, on May 1974. Reported by *A Gazeta Esportiva*, 10/06/1974, p. 3.

⁸⁹ One more excerpt of Franchi's speech, in *A Gazeta Esportiva*, 10/06/1974, p. 5.

⁹⁰ Cf. *A Gazeta Esportiva*, 12/06/1974, p. 20.

⁹¹ Speech of Tessema, President of the African Confederation of Football, reported by *A Gazeta Esportiva*, 16/06/1974, p. 6.